

BERLIN CONT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE
(By Special Means)

LN/dem 28 Oct 61
1200 hrs

TO: SECDEF - PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY MC NAMARA
JCS - PERSONAL FOR GEN LEMNITZER

INFO: STATE - PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY RUSK
US EMB BONN - PERSONAL FOR AMB DOWLING

PRS 2741

(To be delivered on arrival at their offices; 28 Oct)

FROM GENERAL NORSTAD.

1. Having seen Berlin message 855, Bonn 1021, Moscow 1386, and having talked with Dowling on the phone, I wish to express my views on the serious situation now existing in Berlin.

2. We are in a position from which we can move forward, backward, perhaps sideways, but we cannot stand still. In order that the actions we may be required to take over the next few days may lead to something other than an inevitable clash of arms, we must have a clear decision now. I suggest the following course of action be considered:

a. That we exploit to the maximum by every possible propaganda means, and get our Allies to do the same, the note struck yesterday afternoon to the effect that the responsibility of the Russians in East Germany and East Berlin, and their sovereignty in fact in that

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NLE Case	85-37-1
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
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~~TOP SECRET~~

area, have now been clearly established by the presence of Soviet tanks and troops near the Friedrichstrasse check point.

b. That we restrict Russian entrance and exit to and from West Berlin to one gate, preferably other than Friedrichstrasse. Since the Soviets have done this to us, they must put up with a little pushing around on this point from us.

c. That the rules governing Soviet entrance into the Western sectors and the entrance of Tripartite personnel into the Soviet sector be placed on a completely reciprocal basis, emphasizing the fact that the Soviet personnel will show identification to West Berlin police where identification is required under the reciprocal arrangements. This is substantially the proposal made by Thompson in 1986 to the Dept of State. In this connection, we should emphasize the fact that we will show identification to the police at the check point, since the presence of Russian forces has established the fact that whether the police are German or Russian, they are still symbols of Russian authority.



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3. Unless accomplished speedily, the proposals made in this message would run the risk of being a step backward. I think therefore that we have no more than 24 hours in which to take action.

4. I know that the suggestion I have made herein is at best a step sideways. I firmly believe, however, it is the course of wisdom.

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